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Joined: 14 Sep 2005 Posts: 1079
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Posted: Thu Sep 22, 2005 5:55 am Post subject: John Locke's Letter on Religious Toleration |
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(10-29-2000)
A Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke
HONOURED SIR,
Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual
toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must
needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief
characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast
of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward
worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy
of their faith- for everyone is orthodox to himself- these things, and all
others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power
and empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone
have never so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of
charity, meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to
those that are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true
Christian himself. "The kings of the Gentiles exercise leadership over
them," said our Saviour to his disciples, "but ye shall not be so" (Luke 22.
25). The business of true religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted
in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of
ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to
the regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety.
Whosoever will list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first
place and above all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in
vain for any man to unsurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life,
purity of manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. "Let everyone that
nameth the name of Christ, depart from iniquity" (II Tim. 2. 19). "Thou,
when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren," said our Lord to Peter
(Luke 22. 32). It would, indeed, be very hard for one that appears
careless about his own salvation to persuade me that he were extremely
concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should sincerely and
heartily apply themselves to make other people Christians, who have not
really embraced the Christian religion in their own hearts. If the Gospel
and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a Christian without
charity and without that faith which works, not by force, but by love. Now,
I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute, torment, destroy, and
kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of
friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I shall then indeed, and
not until then, believe they do so, when I shall see those fiery zealots
correcting, in the same manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance
for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the Gospel;
when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of their
own communion that are tainted with enormous vices and without
amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them
thus express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls by the
infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be
out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men's souls that
they deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments,
starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take
away their lives- I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians
and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom, fraud,
malice, and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle; Rom.
I). manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and
abound amongst their flocks and people? These, and such-like things, are
certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church,
and to the salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from
ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst
accompanied with innocence of life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for
God, for the Church, and for the salvation of souls- burning I say, literally,
with fire and faggot- pass by those moral vices and wickednesses,
without any chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be
diametrically opposite to the profession of Christianity, and bend all its
nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of
opinions, which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that
exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties
contending about these things is in the right, which of them is guilty of
schism or heresy, whether those that domineer or those that suffer, will
then at last be manifest when the causes of their separation comes to be
judged of He, certainly, that follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and
bears His yoke, though he forsake both father and mother, separate from
the public assemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomsoever or
whatsoever else he relinquishes, will not then be judged a heretic.
Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be
never so obstructive of the salvation of souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery,
fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry, and such-like things,
cannot be denied to be works of the flesh, concerning which the apostle
has expressly declared that "they who do them shall not inherit the
kingdom of God" (Gal. 5). Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely solicitous
about the kingdom of God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the
enlargement of it amongst men, ought to apply himself with no less care
and industry to the rooting out of these immoralities than to the
extirpation of sects. But if anyone do otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and
implacable towards those that differ from him in opinion, he be indulgent
to such iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a
Christian, let such a one talk never so much of the Church, he plainly
demonstrates by his actions that it is another kingdom he aims at and not
the advancement of the kingdom of God.
That any man should think fit to cause another man- whose salvation he
heartily desires- to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted
state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any
other also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can
proceed from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that men
ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and
conform to this or that exterior worship, without any regard had unto their
morals; if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto
the faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and
allowing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it cannot
be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous
assembly joined in the same profession with himself; but that he
principally intends by those means to compose a truly Christian Church is
altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at if those who
do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion, and of the
Church of Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the Christian
warfare. If, like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired the
good of souls, they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect
example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His soldiers to the subduing
of nations, and gathering them into His Church, not armed with the
sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with the Gospel of
peace and with the exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was His
method. Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if those that are
either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from their errors by armed
soldiers, we know very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it
with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church, how
potent soever, with all his dragoons.
The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so
agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of
mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to
perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not
here tax the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable
zeal of others. These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps
scarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will bear the plain
imputation of, without covering them with some specious colour; and so
pretend to commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own
irregular passions. But, however, that some may not colour their spirit of
persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public
weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of
religion, may not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in
a word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the
pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and
sincerity in the worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to
distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion
and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this
be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be
always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on
the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and, on the
other side, a care of the commonwealth.
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only
for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the
possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture,
and the like.
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal
laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his
subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this
life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,
established for the preservation of those things, his presumption is to be
checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or
diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and
ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be
punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his
liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and
strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that
violate any other man's rights.
Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these
civil concernments, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that
it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of
souls, these following considerations seem unto me abundantly to
demonstrate.
First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate,
any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God;
because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one
man over another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such
power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because
no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to
leave to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to
him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would,
conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true
religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is
not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever
outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind
that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession
and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great
obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other
sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty
such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the
number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy and contempt of His
Divine Majesty.
In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil
magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true
and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without
which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by
outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of
that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the
inward judgement that they have framed of things.
It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of
arguments, and, thereby; draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and
procure their salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other
men. In teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he
may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not
oblige him to put off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to
persuade, another to command; one thing to press with arguments,
another with penalties. This civil power alone has a right to do; to the
other, goodwill is authority enough. Every man has commission to
admonish, exhort, convince another of error, and, by reasoning, to draw
him into truth; but to give laws, receive obedience, and compel with the
sword, belongs to none but the magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm
that the magistrate's power extends not to the establishing of any articles
of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no
force at all without penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely
impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither
the profession of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward
form of worship (as has been already said), can be available to the
salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the acceptableness of
the other unto God be thoroughly believed by those that so profess and
practise. But penalties are no way capable to produce such belief. It is
only light and evidence that can work a change in men's opinions; which
light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other
outward penalties.
In the third place, the care of the salvation of men's souls cannot belong
to the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of
penalties were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would
not that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For there being but one
truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men would be led
into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under
the necessity to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates
of their own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the will
of their governors and to the religion which either ignorance, ambition, or
superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were
born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the
princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the
narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone would be in the
right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their
princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which heightens the
absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe their
eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity.
These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to
the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the power
of civil government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the
care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to
come.
Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a
voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord
in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge
acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.
I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any
church; otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by
the same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone
would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which
nothing can be imagined more absurd. Thus, therefore, that matter
stands. No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but
everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he
has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God.
The hope of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that
communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there. For if
afterwards he discover anything either erroneous in the doctrine or
incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined himself,
why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No
member of a religious society can be tied with any other bonds but what
proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A church, then, is a
society of members voluntarily uniting to that end.
It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto
what laws it is subject.
Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight
occasion instituted, whether of philosophers for learning, of merchants for
commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse, no
church or company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but
will presently dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be regulated by some
laws, and the members all consent to observe some order. Place and
time of meeting must be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding
members must be established; distinction of officers, and putting things
into a regular course, and suchlike, cannot be omitted. But since the
joining together of several members into this church-society, as has
already been demonstrated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it
necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can belong to none but
the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to those whom
the society by common consent has authorised thereunto.
Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true
church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling authority
derived from the very apostles, and continued down to the present times
by an uninterrupted succession.
To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which
Christ has imposed that law upon His Church. And let not any man think
me impertinent, if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms
of that edict be very express and positive; for the promise He has made
us (Matt. 18. 20), that "wheresoever two or three are gathered together"
in His name, He will be in the midst of them, seems to imply the contrary.
Whether such an assembly want anything necessary to a true church,
pray do you consider. Certain I am that nothing can be there wanting unto
the salvation of souls, which is sufficient to our purpose.
Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst
even those who lay so much stress upon the Divine institution and
continued succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their
very dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and,
consequently, allows a liberty of choosing that which upon consideration
we prefer.
And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their
church, established by such a long series of succession as they judge
necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to
that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which
are necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical
liberty will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a legislator
imposed upon him but whom himself has chosen.
But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask
them here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ
to make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such
things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in
express words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be
not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their
own inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine
authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary
to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do
either not mention, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever
requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ
does not require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed
constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion and his own
advantage; but how that can be called the Church of Christ which is
established upon laws that are not His, and which excludes such persons
from its communion as He will one day receive into the Kingdom of
Heaven, I understand not. But this being not a proper place to inquire into
the marks of the true church, I will only mind those that contend so
earnestly for the decrees of their own society, and that cry out
continually, "The Church! the Church!" with as much noise, and perhaps
upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for their Diana;
this, I say, I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel frequently declares
that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but that the
Church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and
sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of
the books of the New Testament.
The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public
worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All
discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws
to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this
society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is
here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs
wholly to the civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is
subject to his jurisdiction.
But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be
established, if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I
answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such
things, whereof the external profession and observation- if not
proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind- is
altogether useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of
this society are to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions,
and advices. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and
the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but
that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for
their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society. This
is the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority. No other
punishment can thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing
between the body and the member which is cut off. The person so
condemned ceases to be a part of that church.
These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How
far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by
it?
And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to
retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues
obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the
condition of communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them
were permitted without any animadversion the society would immediately
be thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be
taken that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof,
carry with it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person
may any wise be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often
been said) belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons
at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust
violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the
excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly
possessed. All those things belong to the civil government and are under
the magistrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication consists
only in this: that, the resolution of the society in that respect being
declared, the union that was between the body and some member comes
thereby to be dissolved; and, that relation ceasing, the participation of
some certain things which the society communicated to its members, and
unto which no man has any civil right, comes also to cease. For there is
no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church
minister's refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of the
Lord's Supper, which was not bought with his but other men's money.
Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice
another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or
religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a
denizen, are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business
of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be
Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow
measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to
it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural
fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right
way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to
punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be
miserable in that which is to come.
What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing
from one another in religion, I understand also of particular churches
which stand, as it were, in the same relation to each other as private
persons among themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of
jurisdiction over any other; no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it
sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the
civil government can give no new right to the church, nor the church to
the civil government. So that, whether the magistrate join himself to any
church, or separate from it, the church remains always as it was before- a
free and voluntary society. It neither requires the power of the sword by
the magistrate's coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instruction and
excommunication by his going from it. This is the fundamental and
immutable right of a spontaneous society- that it has power to remove
any of its members who transgress the rules of its institution; but it
cannot, by the accession of any new members, acquire any right of
jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace,
equity, and friendship are always mutually to be observed by particular
churches, in the same manner as by private persons, without any
pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another.
That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two
churches- the one of Arminians, the other of Calvinists- residing in the city
of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has right
to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we
see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some
doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the meanwhile, silently
stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage
against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating
the other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by
what right? It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox
church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical.
This is, in great and specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every
church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For
whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary
unto those things it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy
between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of
their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at
Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be
determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme
judge of all men, to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the
erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those men consider how heinously they
sin, who, adding injustice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride,
do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of
another master, who are not at all accountable to them.
Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches
were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any
right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in
worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith
to convince men's minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us
suppose, nevertheless, that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of
them and to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they
might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any
right can be derived unto a Christian church over its brethren from a
Turkish emperor? An infidel, who has himself no authority to punish
Christians for the articles of their faith, cannot confer such an authority
upon any society of Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has
not himself. This would be the case at Constantinople; and the reason of
the thing is the same in any Christian kingdom. The civil power is the
same in every place. Nor can that power, in the hands of a Christian
prince, confer any greater authority upon the Church than in the hands of
a heathen; which is to say, just none at all.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most
violent of these defenders of the truth, the opposers of errors, the
exclaimers against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God,
with which they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the
civil magistrate on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has given
them the better end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the
stronger, then presently peace and charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise
they are religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to
carry on persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live
upon fair terms and preach up toleration. When they are not strengthened
with the civil power, then they can bear most patiently and unmovedly
the contagion of idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood;
of which on other occasions the interest of religion makes them to be
extremely apprehensive. They do not forwardly attack those errors which
are in fashion at court or are countenanced by the government. Here they
can be content to spare their arguments; which yet (with their leave) is
the only right method of propagating truth, which has no such way of
prevailing as when strong arguments and good reason are joined with the
softness of civility and good usage.
Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor
even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and
worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of
another opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious
a seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds,
rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and
security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established
or preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion
is founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.
In the third place, let us see what the duty of toleration requires from
those who are distinguished from the rest of mankind (from the laity, as
they please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character and office;
whether they be bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or however else
dignified or distinguished. It is not my business to inquire here into the
original of the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that,
whencesoever their authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought
to be confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner
be extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely
separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both
sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together,
the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies,
which are in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly
distinct and infinitely different from each other. No man, therefore, with
whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be dignified, can deprive another man
that is not of his church and faith either of liberty or of any part of his
worldly goods upon the account of that difference between them in
religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole Church cannot by any
ecclesiastical right become lawful to any of its members.
But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from
violence and rapine and all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be
a successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is
obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill
towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards
those that differ from them in faith and worship as well as towards those
that agree with them therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all
men, whether private persons or magistrates (if any such there be in his
church), to charity, meekness, and toleration, and diligently endeavour to
ally and temper all that heat and unreasonable averseness of mind which
either any man's fiery zeal for his own sect or the craft of others has
kindled against dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how happy
and how great would be the fruit, both in Church and State, if the pulpits
everywhere sounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I
should seem to reflect too severely upon those men whose dignity I
desire not to detract from, nor would have it diminished either by others
or themselves. But this I say, that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that
professes himself to be a minister of the Word of God, a preacher of the
gospel of peace, teach otherwise, he either understands not or neglects
the business of his calling and shall one day give account thereof unto the
Prince of Peace. If Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from
all manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied
injuries, how much more ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no
harm done them, forbear violence and abstain from all manner of
ill-usage towards those from whom they have received none! This caution
and temper they ought certainly to use towards those. who mind only
their own business and are solicitous for nothing but that (whatever men
think of them) they may worship God in that manner which they are
persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have the strongest
hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs, in the management
of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider
what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best. No
man complains of the ill-management of his neighbour's affairs. No man is
angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in
marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his
substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make
whatsoever expenses he pleases, nobody murmurs, nobody controls him;
he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not
there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if
he brings not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or
the other congregation, this immediately causes an uproar. The
neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be
the avenger of so great a crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience
to refrain from violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the
poor man be, according to form, condemned to the loss of liberty, goods,
or life. Oh, that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply
themselves with all the strength of arguments that they are able to the
confounding of men's errors! But let them spare their persons. Let them
not supply their want of reasons with the instruments of force, which
belong to another jurisdiction and do ill become a Churchman's hands. Let
them not call in the magistrate's authority to the aid of their eloquence or
learning, lest perhaps, whilst they pretend only love for the truth, this
their intemperate zeal, breathing nothing but fire and sword, betray their
ambition and show that what they desire is temporal dominion. For it will
be very difficult to persuade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and
satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner to be burnt
alive, does sincerely and heartily concern himself to save that brother
from the flames of hell in the world to come.
In the last place, let us now consider what is the magistrate's duty in the
business of toleration, which certainly is very considerable.
We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the
magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I mean (if I may so call it), which
consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a
charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading,
cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man's soul
belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect
the care of his soul? I answer: What if he neglect the care of his health or
of his estate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the
magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law
that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as
is possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the
fraud and violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence
or ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to
be rich or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God Himself will not save
men against their wills. Let us suppose, however, that some prince were
desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to preserve the
health and strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they
must consult none but Roman physicians, and shall everyone be bound to
live according to their prescriptions? What, shall no potion, no broth, be
taken, but what is prepared either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva
shop? Or, to make these subjects rich, shall they all be obliged by law to
become merchants or musicians? Or, shall everyone turn victualler, or
smith, because there are some that maintain their families plentifully and
grow rich in those professions? But, it may be said, there are a thousand
ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed,
especially by those that plead for compelling men into this or the other
way. For if there were several ways that led thither, there would not be so
much as a pretence left for compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with
my utmost vigour in that way which, according to the sacred geography,
leads straight to Jerusalem, why am I beaten and ill-used by others
because, perhaps, I wear not buskins; because my hair is not of the right
cut; because, perhaps, I have not been dipped in the right fashion;
because I eat flesh upon the road, or some other food which agrees with
my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways, which seem unto me to
lead into briars or precipices; because, amongst the several paths that
are in the same road, I choose that to walk in which seems to be the
straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company with some
travellers that are less grave and others that are more sour than they
ought to be; or, in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or is not,
clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we consider right,
we shall find that, for the most part, they are such frivolous things as
these that (without any prejudice to religion or the salvation of souls, if
not accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed
or omitted. I say they are such-like things as these which breed
implacable enmities amongst Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the
substantial and truly fundamental part of religion.
But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of
their mode, that from these circumstances are different ends. What shall
we conclude from thence? There is only one of these which is the true way
to eternal happiness: but in this great variety of ways that men follow, it
is still doubted which is the right one. Now, neither the care of the
commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws, does discover this way that
leads to heaven more certainly to the magistrate than every private
man's search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak body,
sunk under a languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is one only
remedy, but that unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate
to prescribe me a remedy, because there is but one, and because it is
unknown? Because there is but one way for me to escape death, will it
therefore be safe for me to do whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those
things that every man ought sincerely to inquire into himself, and by
meditation, study, search, and his own endeavours, attain the knowledge
of, cannot be looked upon as the peculiar possession of any sort of men.
Princes, indeed, are born superior unto other men in power, but in nature
equal. Neither the right nor the art of ruling does necessarily carry along
with it the certain knowledge of other things, and least of all of true
religion. For if it were so, how could it come to pass that the lords of the
earth should differ so vastly as they do in religious matters? But let us
grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a
prince than by his subjects, or at least that in this incertitude of things the
safest and most commodious way for private persons is to follow his
dictates. You will say: "What then?" If he should bid you follow
merchandise for your livelihood, would you decline that course for fear it
should not succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant upon the prince's
command, because, in case I should have ill-success in trade, he is
abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be true, as he
pretends, that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can set me up
again when unsuccessful voyages have broken me. But this is not the
case in the things that regard the life to come; if there I take a wrong
course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate's
power to repair my loss, to ease my suffering, nor to restore me in any
measure, much less entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given
for the Kingdom of Heaven?
Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgement,
that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil
magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has determined, that the
civil magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority
that nobody shall either act or believe in the business of religion otherwise
than the Church teaches. So that the judgement of those things is in the
Church; the magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and requires
the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how frequently
the name of the Church, which was venerable in time of the apostles, has
been made use of to throw dust in the people's eyes in the following ages?
But, however, in the present case it helps us not. The one only narrow
way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate than to
private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide, who
may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is
less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many
kings of the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus
blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry and thereby into destruction?
Yet, nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage and tell me that all is
now safe and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the
observance of his own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees
of the Church. Of what Church, I beseech you? of that, certainly, which
likes him best. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter
into this or the other Church, did not interpose his own judgement in the
matter. What difference is there whether he lead me himself, or deliver
me over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his will, and it is
he that determines both ways of my eternal state. Would an Israelite that
had worshipped Baal upon the command of his king have been in any
better condition because somebody had told him that the king ordered
nothing in religion upon his own head, nor commanded anything to be
done by his subjects in divine worship but what was approved by the
counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by the doctors of
their Church? If the religion of any Church become, therefore, true and
saving, because the head of that sect, the prelates and priests, and those
of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praise it, what
religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false, and destructive? I am
doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I am suspicious of the
way of worship practised by the Papists, or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot
safer for me to join either unto the one or the other of those Churches,
upon the magistrate's command, because he commands nothing in
religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that Church?
But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a
convention of clergymen, making canons, must be called by that name) is
for the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court
by the Church. How the Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and
Arian emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote, our
modern English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry
VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy
changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worship,
everything according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet
were those kings and queens of such different minds in point of religion,
and enjoined thereupon such different things, that no man in his wits (I
had almost said none but an atheist) will presume to say that any sincere
and upright worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their
several decrees. To conclude, it is the same thing whether a king that
prescribes laws to another man's religion pretend to do it by his own
judgement, or by the ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The
decisions of churchmen, whose differences and disputes are sufficiently
known, cannot be any sounder or safer than his; nor can all their
suffrages joined together add a new strength to the civil power. Though
this also must be taken notice of- that princes seldom have any regard to
the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are not favourers of their own faith and
way of worship.
But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines
this controversy, is this: Although the magistrate's opinion in religion be
sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not
thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for
me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the
dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the
blessed. I may grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be
cured of some disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot
be saved by a religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in
vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's
profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that procure
acceptance with God. The most likely and most approved remedy can
have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as taken;
and you will in vain cram a medicine down a sick man's throat, which his
particular constitution will be sure to turn into poison. In a word,
whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no
religion which I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto
me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their subjects to come into their
Church communion, under pretence of saving their souls. If they believe,
they will come of their own accord, if they believe not, their coming will
nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the pretence of
good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men's souls, men
cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And therefore, when
all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.
Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in
matters of religion, let us now consider what they are to do. All men know
and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why
otherwise do they compel one another unto the public assemblies? Men,
therefore, constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious
society, that they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to
own to the world that they worship God and offer unto His Divine Majesty
such service as they themselves are not ashamed of and such as they
think not unworthy of Him, nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by
the purity of doctrine, holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they
may draw others unto the love of the true religion, and perform such
other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.
These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate
ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies of the people is
nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of- I
mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference
between the National Church and other separated congregations.
But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered-
the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of
things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of
toleration may the more clearly be understood.
Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate
has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church, or much less in
another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of
God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but
because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only so far
justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto
Him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither well in
itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things, therefore,
upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command
them to offend God, which, considering that the end of all religion is to
please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end, appears
to be absurd beyond expression.
But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the
magistrate all manner of power about indifferent things, which, if it be not
granted, the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I
readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are
subjected to the legislative power. But it does not therefore follow that the
magistrate may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is
indifferent. The public good is the rule and measure of all law-making. If
a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so
indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.
And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are
brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the
reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use they have no
connection at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the
salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any
member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there made use of.
Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious
assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate
of any man. For example, let it be granted that the washing of an infant
with water is in itself an indifferent thing, let it be granted also that the
magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or
preventing of any disease the children are subject unto, and esteem the
matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may
order it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has
the same right to ordain by law that all children shall be baptised by
priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls? The
extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight.
Or let us apply the last case to the child of a Jew, and the thing speaks
itself. For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that
are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge that such an injury may not be done
unto a Jew as to compel him, against his own opinion, to practise in his
religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that
anything of this kind may be done to a Christian?
Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human
authority, be made any part of the worship of God- for this very reason:
because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not capable,
by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or
authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable
them to do it. In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things
which God has not forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those
things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion.
Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as
they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by some positive command,
has ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will
vouchsafe to accept at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when an
incensed Deity shall ask us, "Who has required these, or such-like things
at your hands?" will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate
commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend thus far, what might not
lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies,
what superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate's authority, might
not (against conscience) be imposed upon the worshippers of God? For
the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the
religious use of such things as are in their own nature indifferent; nor are
they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of
them. The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in
their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether
indifferent. Will any man, therefore, say that these things could have been
introduced into religion and made a part of divine worship if not by divine
institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this,
why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the
holy banquet as a part of divine worship? Why not the sprinkling of the
blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by water or fire, and
abundance more of this kind? But these things, how indifferent soever
they be in common uses, when they come to be annexed unto divine
worship, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God as the
sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is
there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally
and infinitely distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be that God
required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see,
therefore, that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the
power of the civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be
introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because,
in the worship of God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that
worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour.
But that cannot be done by him who, upon the command of another,
offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him, because
not commanded by Himself. This is not to please God, or appease his
wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest
contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of
worship.
But it will be here asked: "If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to
human discretion, how is it then that Churches themselves have the
power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the
like?" To this I answer that in religious worship we must distinguish
between what is part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance.
That is a part of the worship which is believed to be appointed by God and
to be well-pleasing to Him, and therefore that is necessary.
Circumstances are such things which, though in general they cannot be
separated from worship, yet the particular instances or modifications of
them are not determined, and therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort
are the time and place of worship, habit and posture of him that worships.
These are circumstances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has not
given any express command about them. For example: amongst the Jews
the time and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated
in it were not mere circumstances, but a part of the worship itself, in
which, if anything were defective, or different from the institution, they
could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But these, to Christians
under the liberty of the Gospel, are mere circumstances of worship, which
the prudence of every Church may bring into such use as shall be judged
most subservient to the end of order, decency, and edification. But, even
under the Gospel, those who believe the first or the seventh day to be set
apart by God, and consecrated still to His worship, to them that portion of
time is not a simple circumstance, but a real part of Divine worship, which
can neither be changed nor neglected.
In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws
the use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has he any
power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already
received, approved, and practised by any Church; because, if he did so,
he would destroy the Church itself: the end of whose institution is only to
worship God with freedom after its own manner.
You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to
sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused)
lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any
other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them,
because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer: No. These
things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private
house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any
religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon account of
religion should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be
prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at
home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby
done to any one, no prejudice to another man's goods. And for the same
reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the doing
so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do it. The
part of the magistrate is only to take care that the commonwealth receive
no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or
estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a
sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state of things that the
interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be
forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle
that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not
that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any
calves for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case,
the law is not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the
sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.
By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the
Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be
prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto
any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be
forbidden by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man
may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own
house, the law ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious
worship; though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very
different and be there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine
worship. But those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a
people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those
things ought not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only
the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his
authority to the oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.
It may be said: "What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be
tolerated by the magistrate?" I answer: What power can be given to the
magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church,
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