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Sitaram · Site Admin Joined: 14 Sep 2005 Posts: 1079

Date: Thu Jul 24, 2003 6:39 am
Subject: Gauguin & Moral Luck

http://www.sulekha.com/chpost.asp...ilosophy&show=0&cid=66991

Gauguin & Moral Luck

http://www.artspike.net/publish/public_html/print.php?sid=1771

MORAL LUCK OR MORAL EXCUSE

I

According to conceptions that I will call `Kantian', moral value is a
special value that is immune to luck and `unconditioned'. Under this
view, intention in action is more important than changes actually
effected in the world. Further, moral value must under this view be
the value of supreme importance. At the most important level, for an
agent's reflective assessment of his own actions, luck cannot matter
in justifying what he did. The measure for justification of action is
the rational deliberation of that action.

Williams argues that moral values are conditioned and subject to
luck. He concentrates on the idea of rational justification. He uses
the case of `Gauguin' as an example of how, in some unusual
instances, action must be rationally justified based on the results,
rather than deliberation, and therefore is subject to `moral luck';
and, further, that such justification need not be moral and therefore
that moral value is not supreme.

Williams' `Gauguin' is a creative artist who chooses to leave
pressing human claims, including a wife and children, in order to
pursue his art. According to Williams, "…the only thing that will
justify his (Gauguin's) choice will be success itself."- if he fails,
then he did the wrong thing. Such justification will be necessarily
retrospective, because he cannot know for sure beforehand whether he
will succeed.

Williams argues that this case illustrates a shortcoming in a Kantian
type rules theory. Assuming that a moral theorist attaches some value
to the success of Gauguin's project and therefore to his choice, he
might try to, "…accommodate that choice within a framework of moral
rules, by forming a subsidiary rule which could, before the outcome,
justify that choice." But such trying to find a universalizable rule
for such a case seems absurd.

Utilitarian formulations, according to Williams, don't contribute any
more to the case. They can, in a sense, weigh the action as better or
worse, but this doesn't help in a characterization of the decision;
and further, the conception of better becomes difficult to ascertain.
More importantly for Williams, "The Utilitarian perspective, not
uniquely but clearly, will miss a very important dimension of such
cases, the question of what `failure' may relevantly be."

Williams argues that because Kantian or Utilitarian perspectives
cannot allow for cases such as that of Gaugin, they are fundamentally
flawed. The flaw seems to lie in a conception of morality as being
justifiable independent of results. Only through retrospective
justification, taking into consideration the results, can we fairly
analyze that action. It is important for Williams how a project
fails - through intrinsic or extrinsic luck - because his concept of
retrospective justification depends on what the agent thinks about
himself, and therefore he must be intrinsically connected with the
project's success or failure. The agent must know whether he is right
or wrong.

This leads to Williams' discussion of `agent-regret', or how the
agent feels towards his own past actions. `Agent-regret' infers that
the agent wishes that he had acted otherwise. Gauguin does not feel
such regret unless his project fails. Williams uses `agent-regret' to
reassert the importance of retrospective justification: "…the notions
of regret or lack of regret at the past level of deliberative
excellence makes sense only in the context of a policy or disposition
of rational deliberation applied to an on-going class of cases." In
other words, the moral agent is changed or shaped by each of his
actions, and thusly his deliberative disposition in some sense
evolves. His actions, then, can only be fairly evaluated based on
this constantly evolving viewpoint.

II

Most moral decisions can be evaluated based on the rational
deliberation that led to the decision. These cases need not answer to
the question of `moral luck' because they can be judged independent
of the results. In order to show that morality can be subject to
luck, then, Williams needs to show that there are cases where the
justification for a moral decision, if there is one, is necessarily
retrospective based on its results. If justification in these cases
is dependent upon results, luck or chance happenings that influence
the results help determine morality in these cases.

I intend to show that reflective assessment and retrospective
justification are not the correct means by which to evaluate moral
decision making; and that rational deliberation, which Williams
dismisses in these cases, is essentially the only means by which
moral decisions can be evaluated. I will pay special attention to
Williams' criticism of moral theory, as well as his views on regret
and rational deliberation.

Williams is careful to choose moral dilemmas with two important
characteristics. First, the action chosen is morally questionable
regardless of any good its results might create (i.e. there will
necessarily be some negative results) and regardless of moral theory.
Gauguin abandons his wife and family behind in order to become a
great painter. I would be hard pressed to find a theory where this
action (either in itself or in combination with it's successful
conclusion) would be considered good, though it would not necessarily
be considered blameworthy. Second, the result of the action, if
successful, creates a substantial good for the agent which conditions
or shapes the agent's sense of what is significant in his life, and
therefore determines his standpoint for retrospective assessment.
Painter is an essential part of who Gauguin is after the success of
his project, perhaps the most essential part. The amount of good
created is ambiguous or especially difficult to weigh. How great of a
good do Gauguin's paintings create? Is this good greater than the
good of staying with his wife and children?

Williams argues that moral dilemmas with these two characteristics
cannot be justified using a Kantian or rules based moral theory or a
Utilitarian theory. However, it seems he shows not that the case
could not be morally justified before the outcome, but that he cannot
conceive of how to formulate such a justification. He admits that, "…
even if Gauguin can be ultimately justified, that need not provide
him with any way of justifying himself to others, or at least to all
others." It seems that Williams needs this `ultimate justification'
to be synonymous with the agent's retrospective justification. But if
retrospective justification does not allow the agent to justify
himself to society nor to justify himself under moral theory, what
purpose does such justification serve? It seems an invitation to self-
delusion or selfishness. Further, he fails to consider that, whether
he likes it or not, the actions may not be justifiable even if
successful.

Williams argues that it is absurd to find a rule that fits these
cases. However, it seems here that he looks for such a rule using a
caricature of Kantianism; he tries to make a specific action arising
from a specific dilemma universalizable. He neglects to consider
whether a simpler rule could apply to such a decision. Further,
perhaps the action shouldn't be universalizable because it is wrong.
He is trying to formulate such a rule in order to justify a
questionable action. Even if we attach some value to the success of
Gauguin's project, perhaps there is no good justification for his
choice. It doesn't seem that the purpose of formulating such rules is
to justify fulfilling our desires and whims. Morality seems to be a
thing somewhat more objective - otherwise, as seems to be Williams'
stance, it loses any value.

Williams argues that the Utilitarian perspective fails because,
first, there is no one measure of what the `better' is. This breaks
down, I think, in much the same way as his argument against a rules
theory. Some Utilitarian measures of good may determine that
Gauguin's project is justifiable, others will not. We can
realistically attempt to apply only one theory at a time. And
difficult does not necessarily insinuate wrong. Just because the
theories don't give the results Williams wants doesn't mean they are
irrelevant or wrong.

Williams goes on to say that Utilitarian perspectives, "…will miss a
very important dimension of such cases, the question of
what `failure' may relevantly be." This seems irrelevant, however,
since Utilitarianism need not be justified based on the calculated
goodness of the actual results, only the intended, calculated good
arrived at through rational deliberation. It doesn't matter how the
project fails, or even if it fails (or succeeds). Williams needs the
failure to be intrinsic to the project itself because the connection
between the agent and the outcome is essential in order for
retrospective justification to maintain its importance. This is
because his entire argument is based on what the agent thinks of
himself, rather than how others judge him. That he essentially
dismisses extrinsic luck as unimportant shows, I think, that this is
a flawed concept.

Williams uses the concept of `agent-regret', how the agent feels
towards his own past actions, to show that we cannot detach ourselves
from unintentional aspects of our actions. Such aspects include not
only direct results of these actions, but contingent results such as
changes to how the agent deliberates. Regrets for past deliberations
only make sense in the context of a policy of deliberation applied to
various ongoing cases, and can therefore only be evaluated
retrospectively.

However, Williams himself brings up two points which show that agent-
regret should not effect evaluation of rational deliberation.
First, `agent-regret' is not restricted to voluntary agency in an
action. If we need not have done anything wrong in order to
experience `agent-regret', perhaps it simply means that such regret
is not related to morality but simply to desire or despair. And if
this is the case, retrospective justification loses its importance
because it is simply evaluating our irrational feelings; importance
shifts back to rational deliberation.

Second, in Williams' `agent-regret', the agent wishes that he had
acted otherwise. Regret in general involves a wish that things had
been otherwise, not necessarily that the agent had acted otherwise.
Williams fails to show conclusively, however, that `agent-regret' is
any more rational than more general regret - for instance that of the
lorry-driver who, through no fault of his own, hits a pedestrian, and
wishes he had acted otherwise. We can still justify the action even
if we feel regret after we know the results, because it was the right
decision for the deliberative agent that we were at the time of the
decision. If regret is not contingent upon a rational desire to have
acted otherwise, than the justification of the rational deliberation
of an action is not affected by luck.

If regrets for past actions influences future decisions, every case
of rational deliberation affects every other. Williams contrasts this
view to the view that regret is directed towards failures in rational
deliberation rather than mistakes. He argues that this ignores the
fact that what one does conditions later desires and judgments. For
many decisions regrets are conditioned by retrospective evaluation of
deliberation rather than outcomes. However, in his special cases, the
agent is so identified by the action that if he succeeds, his
standpoint for retrospective assessment, his sense of what is
significant, will be derived from that outcome.

Nagel denies that such examples show that morality is subject to
luck, but instead that Gauguin's fundamental retrospective feelings
need not be moral (shaped as they may be by decisions on morality).
Gauguin could be simply self-deluded, or, as his actions may suggest,
completely egotistical. Further, Williams never seems to claim that
Gauguin's actions will be morally justifiable, even in success.
Instead, his actions will be permissible to himself. Such a claim
says very little. We all tend to rationalize our actions after the
fact and to represent ourselves in the best possible light when so
doing. This certainly doesn't show Gauguin's project to be a higher
good than morality.

This gets to the core of why reflective assessment is not a proper
means by which to evaluate moral decision-making. Williams is
confusing morality with the shaping of the moral agent. Factors such
as the agent's desires, values, regrets, past experience, etc.,
influence the agent's ability to make moral decisions, and what
decisions they make, but they are not necessarily moral justification
for such decisions.

Rational deliberation seems the only sufficient way to evaluate moral
decision making precisely because it is inherently immune to `moral
luck'. It is the only tool over which the moral agent has any
control. As such, it can only be evaluated fairly based on the
circumstances under which it was made, and not based on its successes
or failures. While each case of deliberation does shape each
subsequent case, it does so because it shapes the agent's abilities
of deliberation. Factors such as results are relevant only in
determining whether rational deliberation was sufficient or
successful, in order to improve future deliberation.

III

The importance of retrospective justification in questions of
morality is central to Williams' theory of moral luck. I have argued
that instead, rational deliberation at the time of action seems to be
the only sufficient way to evaluate moral decisions. My argument is
based in large part on the weakness of Williams' claim that Gauguin's
action will, based on retrospective justification, be permissible to
himself; and his hasty dismissal of Kantian and Utililitarian
theories. Williams needs to justify a stronger claim, such that (a)
the results of Gauguin's action created such a substantial good that
it clearly outweighs any negative side effects and is justifiable to
others rather than just himself; and (b) that this desirable good can
only be accounted for through retrospective analysis which takes into
account the evolving rational agent. His weaker claim seems little
more than freshman relativism.

References

Williams, Bernard. 1976. Moral Luck.

Williams, Bernard. 1993. Moral Luck: A Postscript.

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